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 Privacy protection for 
health information research 
in New Zealand district 
health boards 
Vithya Yogarajan, Michael Mayo, Bernhard Pfahringer
New Zealand’s 20 district health boards (DHBs) potentially hold a large vol-ume of health information about the 
over 4.5 million New Zealanders eligible for 
publicly funded health services, including 
medical notes, prescription records, medical 
images and laboratory test results. These re-
cords are potentially an invaluable resource 
for secondary data analysis (henceforth 
referred to as health information research). 
There are several legal and ethical codes 
designed to protect the safety and privacy 
of patients involved in health information 
research. The Health and Disability Commis-
sioner’s Code of Health and Disability 
Services Consumers’ Rights Regulations 
1996 guarantees the rights of anyone 
receiving health and disability services in 
New Zealand. These rights include the right 
to have privacy respected, and the code 
specifi cally states that it also applies to those 
involved in research and teaching.1
The Health Information Privacy Code 
1994 (HPIC) governs how any agency that 
uses health information—such as a DHB—
collects, stores and uses that information, 
among other things.2 The Health Research 
Council’s Health research and privacy: 
Guidance notes for health researchers and 
ethics committees gives detailed guidance 
on how the provisions of the HPIC apply to 
health research in New Zealand.3
The National Ethics Advisory Commit-
tee’s Ethical Guidelines for Observational 
Studies provides guidance on the design 
and conduct of health information research 
projects, as well as other types of observa-
tional studies.4 This includes guidance on 
when an individual patient consent should 
be sought, and which projects have risks 
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that require ethics approval from the Health 
and Disability Ethics Committee (HDEC). The 
guidelines also recommend a set of controls 
for projects which only use anonymous 
or de-identifi ed patient information, ie, 
information from which individual patient 
identity cannot be reconstructed. There is 
a different—much stricter—set of controls 
for projects that use identifi ed or poten-
tially re-identifi able patient information. 
The guidelines note that de-identifi cation 
requires the irreversible removal of all infor-
mation that could be used to identify the 
patient, such as name, date of birth, address 
and postcode. 
The United States Health Insurance 
Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) 
Privacy Rule goes much further and lists 
18 categories of protected health infor-
mation (PHI) that must be removed for 
health records to be considered de-iden-
tifi ed.5 These requirements are arguably 
the worldwide gold standard in de-identifi -
cation and could be regarded as equivalent 
to the New Zealand HPIC requirement that 
the individual cannot be identifi ed.6 A key 
component of the present study was deter-
mining how de-identifi cation practices used 
by New Zealand DHBs compare with this 
gold standard.
We therefore set out to identify the 
methods used by DHBs to protect individual 
patient privacy when providing information 
for health information research. We partic-
ularly focused on current DHB practices 
in de-identifying data provided for health 
information research, as this is a rapidly 
evolving fi eld internationally.7
Methods
The study design was an e-mailed 
questionnaire survey. Information was 
requested from each DHB under the 
Offi  cial Information Act 1982 (OIA).8 A 
standard letter was emailed to the appro-
priate contact address at each DHB, which 
were identifi ed via the Ministry of Health 
website and individual DHB websites. If no 
response was received within the timeframe 
of 20 working days required by the OIA, 
a standard reminder letter was also sent. 
Copies of the standard letters are available 
from the authors on request.
A standard set of questions were asked 
of each DHB, based on the 18 categories 
of protected health information that must 
be removed before health records are 
considered de-identifi ed under the HIPPA 
Privacy Rule. Certain US-specifi c elements 
such as ZIP code and social security number 
were changed to their New Zealand equiv-
alents. The full list of questions is available 
in the Appendix, and from the authors on 
request. The responses were analysed via 
descriptive statistics (frequencies). 
Ethics approval was not required as the 
Offi  cial Information Act gives all New 
Zealand citizens the right to request infor-
mation held by offi  cial bodies, including 
DHBs. Copies of policies, procedures and 
rules for decision-making by offi  cial bodies 
are specifi cally included under the remit of 
the OIA.8 
Results
Out of 20 DHBs in New Zealand, 19 
of them responded to the request (95% 
response rate). We opted not to exercise the 
right under the Offi  cial Information Act to 
appeal the one non-response to the Offi  ce of 
the Ombudsman, as we could not exclude 
the possibility that our request had not been 
received. To ensure that the requests and 
responses were as standardised as possible, 
we decided not to initiate verbal or written 
communication with the DHBs other than 
the two letters, although we did respond to 
requests for clarifi cations. One of the DHBs 
responded that it did not provide patient 
data for research and was excluded from 
further analysis. 
All 18 of the remaining DHBs (100%) 
required research projects to go through 
their internal research approval processes, 
with referral to the Health and Disability 
Ethics Committee (HDEC) as needed. Inter-
estingly, all 18 DHBs (100%) also combined 
ethics approval with individual patient 
consent and/or de-identifi cation of the 
data provided, using more than one type of 
privacy protection.
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Of the 18 DHBs, 14 (78%) provided de-iden-
tifi ed data, either routinely, or if this was a 
condition specifi ed in the research approval. 
The other four DHBs did not de-identify 
data. Among these DHBs, 7 of the 18 DHBs 
(39%) either de-identifi ed all 18 categories 
of protected health information or did not 
collect them in the fi rst place. A further 
four of the 18 DHBs (22%) de-identifi ed all 
elements except dates (including dates of 
birth), which were supplied in the full day/
month/year format. The remaining three of 
the 18 DHBs (17%) provided dates, biometric 
identifi ers such as height and weight, and 
NHI numbers as data matching keys. Figure 
1 provides the breakdown of how DHBs 
de-identify data.
None of the DHBs that de-identifi ed data 
had policies or standard processes explicitly 
related to the de-identifi cation of data. 
Instead, they relied on combinations of their 
general research policies, the requirements 
specifi ed in research approvals, the Health 
Information Privacy Code and institutional 
knowledge among their staff. 
Out of the 18 DHBs, eight (48%) used indi-
vidual patient consents before releasing 
data for research, either routinely or as a 
condition of the research approval. All three 
of the precautions—research approval, 
de-identifi cation and individual consent—
were used by 5 of the 18 DHBs (28%). Other 
privacy measures named by the DHBs 
included staff and researcher confi denti-
ality agreements, encrypted and password 
protected fi les, and cybersecurity procedures. 
Discussion
Summary of findings
Our fi ndings show New Zealand DHBs self-
report that they have suffi  cient processes 
in place to protect patient privacy in health 
information research. All 18 (100%) of the 
DHBs that confi rmed they provide patient 
data for research use at least two of the 
following three precautions: research 
approval, de-identifi cation of patient data 
and individual consent. By doing so, they 
facilitate potentially valuable research while 
complying with relevant legal and ethical 
codes.
Strengths and limitations of the 
present study
To the best of our knowledge, the present 
study is the fi rst to examine health infor-
mation privacy protections across New 
Zealand DHBs, and particularly practices 
related to de-identifi cation. A key strength 
is the 95% response rate. The high response 
rate—perhaps aided by the requirement for 
DHBs to answer OIA requests—minimises 
the possibility of response bias. Using a 
standard set of questions allows relatively 
objective comparison across DHBs.
However, a potential limitation is that the 
fi ndings are based on the responses given by 
DHBs themselves, which may be affected by 
legal and reputational concerns. In addition, 
while a standard set of questions allows 
objective comparison, it limits the scope 
for an in-depth exploration of differences 
between DHBs.
Figure 1: Frequency distribution of the data de-identifi ed by the DHBs.
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The present fi ndings could be validated 
by future case studies that directly observe 
the health information research process at 
individual DHBs, though gaining such direct 
access could be diffi  cult for security and 
confi dentiality reasons. A potential alter-
native are follow-up studies that interview 
key informants at each DHB about how they 
manage privacy requirements, potentially 
supplementing the descriptive fi ndings 
presented here with in-depth qualitative 
analysis. 
Comparison with existing literature
The HPIC places restrictions on collecting 
research information from sources other 
than the individual concerned, such as 
through health records. The HPIC also 
restricts the use of information collected to 
provide healthcare for an unrelated purpose 
such as research.2,3 It similarly restricts the 
disclosure of health information held by the 
DHB to other parties such as researchers 
from outside the DHB.2,3 However, there are 
several exceptions to these restrictions. 
Among these exceptions are:
i) where the individual concerned—or an 
authorised representative if applicable—has 
authorised the collection, use or disclosure 
of the information;
OR
ii) where the information will only be used 
in a form in which the individual concerned 
cannot be identifi ed;
OR
iii) where the information is to be used 
for research purposes (for which approval 
by an ethics committee has been given if 
applicable) and the information will not be 
published in a form that could reasonably 
be expected to identify the individual 
concerned.2,3 
These exceptions give researchers and 
institutions a degree of fl exibility, allowing 
the controls placed on each project to be 
tailored to the risks of that project, rather 
than enforcing a ‘one-size-fi ts-all’ approach. 
The multi-pronged approach used by DHBs 
fi ts this model, with those that use indi-
vidual consent in combination with research 
approval leaning towards the fi rst exception, 
and those who use de-identifi cation in 
combination with research approval 
towards the latter two exceptions. 
The cornerstone of the approach used 
by the DHBs is the ethics approval process. 
Other authors have noted that New 
Zealand’s ethics approval pathways need 
to be strengthened to meet the challenges 
of evaluating health information research, 
which has different risks to interventional 
research.9 These could include stereotyping 
of and discrimination against individuals 
or communities, heightened and self-re-
inforcing surveillance of those perceived 
to be a threat, and opportunities for 
fi nancial exploitation.9–12 It is also essential 
to consider the emerging risks created by 
powerful modern algorithmic or artifi cial 
intelligence-driven data analysis techniques, 
so-called ‘big data’. Individuals’ health 
information could be exposed by inference, 
linkage with other publicly available 
datasets such as voter rolls and postal 
address data, or information that patients 
have shared with commercial entities to 
access goods and services.9–11,13,14 Information 
in the modern world is also, once publicly 
available, essentially ‘immortal’, and chal-
lenging to redact.10,15 Such information could 
potentially compromise the privacy not just 
of the patients concerned, but also their 
family members and descendants.15
Many authors have argued for new models 
of data research oversight that take these 
risks into account and are soundly based on 
human rights principles and international 
law.9,12,16 We support these approaches, 
which will inevitably take time to mature. 
In the meantime, more widespread use of 
individual consent for health information 
research and routine de-identifi cation could 
support the approval process and mitigate 
the risks. These approaches are comple-
mentary, but each comes with its own 
challenges. 
Individual patient consent can increase 
public support, as even members of the 
public who are not concerned with privacy 
are more comfortable with their data being 
used for research if their consent has been 
sought fi rst.17 However, individual consent 
can be impractical where large numbers 
of patients are involved, in some cases can 
affect the validity of the data collected, or 
even be harmful to patients themselves.5 
It was also important to note that the very 
defi nition of consent is affected by how 
data research differs from interventional or 
clinical observation research. For instance, 
can consent be given on behalf of family 
members or descendants whose privacy 
may also be affected? Are participants 
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comfortable with the data being reused 
for other purposes, even in anonymous 
or aggregated form, which they may not 
be aware of? Are they comfortable with 
commercial entities having access to their 
records, and possibly linking this with other 
data those entities may have collected sepa-
rately?11,15 17  Are patients even aware of the 
possibility of any of these things happening?
Greater use of routine de-identifi cation 
can increase rates of patient consent and 
public support. Members of the public are 
more supportive of researchers having 
access to their health information if the 
information has been de-identifi ed.17 
Routine de-identifi cation to the standards 
of the HIPAA Privacy Rule also increases 
the possibility of collaborations with 
health systems, academic institutions 
and public agencies that follow HIPAA or 
equivalent standards. However, manual 
de-identifi cation of large volumes of health 
information is extremely challenging. 
Specially trained personnel who are familiar 
with both medical data and de-identifi cation 
techniques are needed. Also, the process is 
time-consuming and therefore expensive. 
Automated de-identifi cation of medical 
data via machine learning (artifi cial intel-
ligence) is a rapidly developing fi eld but 
has not yet reached the stage where all 18 
categories of information specifi ed in the 
HIPAA Privacy Rule can be consistently 
de-identifi ed to 95% or greater accuracy.18,19 
Given that it is still possible to re-identify 
individuals from ‘de-identifi ed’ data, it is 
also important to debate whether some level 
of individual consent is still needed for the 
collection of de-identifi ed data, or whether 
there is a social consensus that the risks 
are acceptable when weighed against the 
potential gains.20,21
Policy implications
Individual DHBs also listed other strat-
egies for protecting research information 
such as confi dentiality agreements, fi le 
encryption and cybersecurity measures. 
Future work could include evaluating 
how these complement the combination 
of research approval, individual consent 
and de-identifi cation in protecting patient 
privacy. A possible model for a multi-layered 
system to protect patient privacy in health 
information research has been proposed 
previously.22 This applies the Reason model 
of error prevention—widely used in patient 
safety initiatives—to protecting patient 
privacy in health information research.23 It 
also adapts the ‘fi ve safes’ approach used 
by Statistics New Zealand to protect infor-
mation in the Integrated Data Infrastructure 
to health records.24
Such a nationally standardised system 
could benefi t DHBs by reducing legal and 
reputational risks. It could also address 
public concerns that individual DHBs take 
varying approaches to privacy protection, 
potentially giving patients living in one area 
protections that patients living in another 
area may lack (‘postcode privacy’, if you 
will). The current varying approach could 
be considered a natural consequence of the 
fl exibility offered by New Zealand law and 
the DHB model itself, which decentralises 
health service provision and delegates most 
operational decisions to locally based and 
(partly locally elected) DHB boards.25 There 
are also currently no authoritative national 
guidelines on data sharing and the use of 
data in health information research for 
DHBs to draw upon.26 Organisations such as 
the Data Futures Partnership are working 
to develop such guidelines, and such efforts 
should be supported.26
It is important that such guidelines 
consider the values of the New Zealand 
public, and thereby build social consent 
for the use of health records in secondary 
research.26 It is also crucial that such guide-
lines incorporate Māori perspectives on 
consent, autonomy and the rights of—and 
obligations to—extended family (whanau).27 
Such differences may be subtle and will 
naturally vary between generations and 
individuals. However, guidelines drawn 
solely from the dominant Western paradigm 
(which places a premium on the indi-
vidual as an autonomous unit) may be too 
restrictive for the needs of Māori, especially 
considering the health disparities between 
Māori and non-Māori.27
Given the international nature of 
healthcare, research and information fl ow, 
New Zealand’s evolving health information 
research guidelines and research approval 
processes also need to be acceptable to 
potential international research partners 
and overseas regulators. However, vari-
ances in national laws and industry 
codes mean there is no one universally 
accepted set of best practices to set future 
standards against, or indeed for DHBs to 
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measure their current practices against. 
For example, New Zealand’s HPIC, HIPAA 
in the US, Australia’s Federal and State 
privacy laws and the European Union’s 
General Data Protection Regulation each 
have their unique requirements.2,5,6,28,29 
While a full comparative analysis of these 
laws is beyond the scope of this article, all 
set the most stringent requirements on the 
protection of identifi able individuals.2,5,6,28,29 
It stands to reason that developing and 
implementing routine and user-friendly 
de-identifi cation practices would help 
ensure New Zealand’s health information 
research is internationally accepted. 
Conclusion
Our fi ndings show that DHBs self-report 
they have systems in place for protecting 
patient privacy that meet legal and 
ethical standards. However, these can be 
strengthened further to meet the challenges 
posed by increasingly powerful data analysis 
techniques. The lack of standardised 
policies and procedures for de-identifi cation 
increases the risk that de-identifi cation 
may be of variable quality. This could be 
addressed either by policies at the individual 
DHB level, or New Zealand-wide standards 
equivalent to the HIPAA Privacy Rule.5
Appendix
Survey questions 
1. Does [X District Health Board] supply patient data for research?
2. Does [X District Health Board] de-identify patient data before the data are supplied for 
research? If yes, which of the following elements are de-identifi ed? (Please circle all 
that apply). 
a) Names 
b) All geographic subdivisions smaller than DHB catchment area (eg, postal code, 
street address, city) 
c) All elements of date (except year) 
d) Telephone numbers 
e) Fax numbers 
f) Electronic mail (E-mail) addresses 
g) Identifi ers issued by any other Government agency, such as Inland Revenue 
Department (IRD) numbers 
h) National Health Index (NHI) numbers or any other medical record numbers 
i) Health insurance plan benefi ciary numbers 
j) Account numbers (including patient bank account or DHB client account numbers)
k) Certifi cate/license numbers 
l) Vehicle identifi cation and serial numbers, including license plate numbers 
m) Medical device identifi er and serial numbers 
n) Web Universal Resource Locators (URLs) 
o) Biometric identifi ers 
p) Full face photographic images and any comparable images 
q) Any other unique identifying numbers, characteristics or codes 
3. Does [X District Health Board] have a written policy or policies for de-identifi cation of 
patient data before the data are supplied for research? If yes, please provide one copy 
of each policy, or a summary of the policy or policies [maximum one page]. 
4. Does [X District Health Board] have a standard process (separate from that contained 
in a written policy or policies) that must be followed for de-identifi cation of patient 
data before the data are supplied for research? If yes, please provide a description of 
this process [maximum one page]. 
5. If [X District Health Board] has neither a written policy (or policies) or a standard 
process for de-identifi cation of patient data before the data are supplied for research, 
please provide a summary of the steps that are taken to protect patient confi dentiality 
before the data are supplied for research [maximum one page]. 
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